Adding farms for the new PIP-9 jars (3pool, renBTC, wBTC/ETH)

Sounds like there’s a lot of interest for this. @Trilemma has already started a thread here but the way it’s titled it only pertains to the wBTC/ETH jar (sorry!). This thread is to talk about adding farms (i.e. providing Pickle rewards) for all three of these jars.

Some questions we need to discuss:

  1. Should we give Pickle rewards to all three of these jars?
  2. How much Pickle rewards should we give to all these jars?
  3. Is the 75/25 split between ETH/PICKLE still tenable? Or should we change the ratio so we can direct more to the jars?
  4. How would the split work out between these new farms vs the older farms?

If there are any outstanding questions we need to discuss, please let us know!

A lot to be discussed here, so go ahead and put down your thoughts! Please try to edit your text thoroughly before posting and make sure they are well thought-out. And also please, as always, be nice :slight_smile:


to answer your particular question: PICKLE ALL THE JARS obv because we cannot get enough of them (plus, a wider distribition is always good).

I’ve kind of adressed another facet of this question here: Off-Stable Jars

1. How much liquidity do we need? (75% pool 2 rewards)
We currently have $17mil in the PICKLE/ETH pool earning a %233 APY by directing 75% of Pickle emissions to that pool.
It’s not clear if we actually need $17mil in liquidity.

A few points to consider:

  1. Increased liquidity will make pickle prices more stable, which may make pickle tokens seem less risky to farmers across all pools to hold (lower slippage makes pickle prices less volatile).

  2. On the other hand, directing too many rewards to pool2 and paying for excessive liquidity is an opportunity cost as these rewards may be better utilised towards increasing TVL by spraying emissions on new pJars.

  3. Lowering rewards to pool2, and it’s effect on APY is unclear. Some farmers will decide the risk-reward is not good enough and leave, causing APY to move back up into equilibrium.

As for whether we need $17mil in liquidity, or not, here’s a comparison to yearn (where liquidity is not subsidized by rewards):

Yearn (8th largest pool on uniswap)
liquidity: $19.1mil
volume/day: $18.5mil
fees: $55k

Pickle (9th largest pool on uniswap):
liquidity: $17.3mil
volume/day: $3.6mil
fees: $10k

Pickle’s liquidity/volume = 4.8
Yearn’s liquidity/volume = 1.03


So, Pickle may have more liquidity than actually needed (in comparison to YFI where liquidity is not subsidized).
Perhaps a slight reduction from 75% to 70% may free up rewards to bring in TVL on the new pJars instead.

My main concern is that any drastic change to the 75% allocation will cause an exodus in pool2 liquidity, and these farmers (with high risk and high APY appetite) may simply sell and move off platform.

In the interest of price stability, I think any changes to this 75% allocation should be conservative, and gradual. Perhaps a 5% change at most, followed by another 5% in the following week if need be, etc.

2. Rewarding pJars
The main goal of emission towards pJars is to maximize TVL across all our pools.

For the three new pools, the TVLs are currently:
renBTC: $4mil TVL,
3pool: $31mil TVL,
ETH/wBTC: $524mil TVL

To get the most value out of our rewards, we should incentivize the ETH/wBTC pool, and the 3pool.
Note, $104mil of ETH/wBTC is already staked with Pickle according to

The larger pools (the UNI pools) should probably have slightly higher emissions to keep the large TVL happy (compared to the Curve pools).

The renBTC pool may be too small to warrant rewards, and we need to keep the APYs high enough for the other pJars so they can recover their 0.5% fee within a reasonable amount of time (say 1 month before the UNI rewards pool ends)

An overall distribution of rewards might look like:

  • 70% to PICKLE/ETH
  • 6% to pUNIDAI
  • 6% to pUNIUSDC
  • 6% to pUNIUSDT
  • 3% to psCRV
    New pools:
  • 6% to UNI ETH/wBTC
  • 3% to Curve’s 3pool

3. Third option, Rewarding Staking
While not discussed in the initial post, it may be beneficial to reward the Pickle Staking pool with some emissions, say 3~5%.

This has the benefit of making the perceived value of all Pickle rewards across pool2 and pJars more valuable, incentivizing temporary farmers in the pJars to hold, stake, and participate in governance.
They come for the pickle, and stay for the community.

A distribution with incentivized staking pool might look like:

  • 70% to PICKLE/ETH
  • 5% to pUNIDAI
  • 5% to pUNIUSDC
  • 5% to pUNIUSDT
  • 3.333% to psCRV
    New pools:
  • 5% to UNI ETH/wBTC
  • 3.333% to Curve’s 3pool
  • 3.333% to Pickle Staking pool

I think we should focus on incentivising the UNI WBTC/ETH Jar. I wrote up the below post in a different thread (but deleted the post after I saw it had already kind of been suggested).

Feature Request: Add PICKLE incentive to UNI WBTC/ETH Jar.

Why: If we can increase our TVL this should help grow the rewards to PICKLE stakers, and therefore the value of PICKLE.

How: In order to significantly increase our TVL I feel targeting pairs with the greatest long-term liquidity is the lowest hanging fruit. The liquidity in WBTC/ETH pool on Uniswap is in excess of 500 million USD. The new UNI WBTC/ETH Jar (pJar 0.69d) is a great move towards capturing some of this, but in order to add a cherry on top of the new Jars APY, and incentivise some whales to move their liquidity over to Pickle (particularly when an audit is complete), we could divert a small percentage of the 75% Pickle inflation from the PICKLE/ETH farm to the UNI WBTC/ETH Jar.

I understand this will reduce the APY offered to the PICKLE/ETH farm, however this APY will gradually decrease overtime anyway, unless we grow the value of PICKLE (via increase in TVL, and rewards to PICKLE stakers). Therefore, I feel we should focus on targeting incentives to capture liquidity pairs that have the greatest long-term liquidity. In my opinion, increasing the APY of the UNI WBTC/ETH Jar (above that of competitors) with PICKLE provides a good opportunity to do this.

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Here are my thoughts regarding your questions:

Should we give Pickle rewards to all three of these jars?

Short answer: yes. I think that giving Pickle rewards to all who use the Pickle platform is a good idea as it will drive TVL and perhaps bring more users to the community.

How much Pickle rewards should we give to all these jars?

I think that we should give more rewards to jars that are assisting in the core mission: fixing the peg.

Is the 75/25 split between ETH/PICKLE still tenable? Or should we change the ratio so we can direct more to the jars?

I think that we should reconsider this ratio and perhaps scale it slowly. Maybe in 5% increments per week. We could shift the ratio to 70/30. We don’t want to rock the boat on Pickle/ETH liquidity too much.

How would the split work out between these new farms vs the older farms?

IMO, the pJar 0 farms should have the most rewards as they are working to fix the peg issues. The UNI jars are cool, but don’t really help with the peg issues. Of the rewards that are going to jars, I propose a split like this:

  • pJar 0a: 20%
  • pJar 0b: 20%
  • pJar 0c: 20%
  • pJar 0.69a: 10%
  • pJar 0.69b: 10%
  • pJar 0.69c: 10%
  • pJar 0.69d: 10%

My primary focus has been in LP pickle/eth to get the lion’s share at 75% of pickles and build my stack. as an LP I do understand the need to spread some of my pools emissions to jars (and maybe staking as well). The bottom line is to create more value in holding pickle which will have positive price pressure (buy vs sell) and benefitting all of us long-term holders.

I am in favor of GRADUALLY removing some of the emissions from pickle/eth pool2. Exploring the effect of redistributing 5% and seeing how it affects liquidity overall, has my support. If deemed successful we can consider another 5% redistribution later (dropping pool2 to 65% pickle emissions over several weeks).

Hopefully this leads to more TVL in jars and more pickles staked Vs sold.


As a PICKLE/ETH LP I am also in favor of reducing pool2’s share and redistributing it to the new jars. I am not too worried about the actual percentages, I’ll leave that up to others in this thread since I am seeing some good proposals.

I just want the community to have a discussion about how important is the PICKLE/ETH pool going forward and whether we should rethink incentivizing liquidity provision, as long term it seems to not have been thought through. If this has been discussed elsewhere, I am happy to read up. Happy to also move this discussion to a separate thread, if there isn’t any existing.

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Reducing by 5% is not too drastic for pool2 LP, and hugely beneficial for everyone else (70/30).

The percentage split is the tricky part, especially considering UNI mining LPs end in 38 days (November 17). For the short term, I think providing higher % to those UNI pools (like what @peitalin suggested in option 2) will bring some TVL increase. Once the UNI pools end, we can reallocate those rewards to the CRV pools.


Here are some alternative proposals based off your above idea but based off of the revenue generated by apy.

At time of writing from

pool apy tvl
eth/dai lp 26.3% 11.8m
eth/usdt lp 19.7% 46m
eth/usdc lp 21.9% 29.5m
eth/wbtc lp 20.6% .247m
3pool 18% (~40+% if we can boost) 1.1k
renBTC 9.2% (~19%+ if we can boost) 75.8k
sCRV 8% (~14% if we can boost) 10.3m

I propose the following function:

x: tvl by ten millions (i.e. 11.8m => 1.18)
incentive multiplier: 9 - log(x + 1)^2
incentive weight: jar apy * incentive multiplier
weight = lambda x, y: y * (9 - math.pow(math.log(x + 1), 2))

This formula will try to balance giving rewards to high apy strategies, but also incentivize low TVL pools.

The following are the weighted results:

liquidity: 68%
pickle staking: 0.5%

usdt : 3.78%
wbtc : 5.81%
scrv : 2.16%
usdc : 4.95%
dai  : 7.02%
3pool: 5.15%
ren  : 2.63%

For those who might feel that 3% rewards to ren is large, lets say the vault grows to 100 BTC (1/3 of yearn) and all vaults stay the same. The new weights:

usdt : 3.80%
wbtc : 5.84%
scrv : 2.17%
usdc : 4.98%
dai  : 7.05%
3pool: 5.18%
ren  : 2.48%

The weight allocated to ren will actually go down as it now has started to attract more value.
It can probably be argued that PICKLE staking shouldn’t get any PICKLE so this scenario would provide:

usdt : 3.84%
wbtc : 5.90%
scrv : 2.20%
usdc : 5.03%
dai  : 7.13%
3pool: 5.23%
ren  : 2.67%

with 70% rather than 68% to liquidity
usdt : 3.60%
wbtc : 5.53%
scrv : 2.06%
usdc : 4.72%
dai  : 6.68%
3pool: 4.91%
ren  : 2.51%
import math

pools = {
  'dai': [.263, 1.18], 
  'usdt': [.197, 4.6],
  'usdc': [.219, 2.95],
  'wbtc': [.203, 0.0247],
  '3pool': [.18, .0001],
  'ren': [.092, .0007],
  'scrv': [.08, 1.03]

def wt(entry):
  return entry[0] * (9 - math.pow(math.log(entry[1] + 1), 2))

def calc_rates():
  total_weight = 0
  weights = {}
  for pool in pools:
    weights[pool] = wt(pools[pool])
    total_weight += weights[pool]
  # 68 liquidity + .5 staking
  emission_percent = 30
  for weight in weights:
    weights[weight] = (weights[weight] / total_weight) * emission_percent

  for weight in weights:
    print('{}: {:.2f}%'.format(weight.ljust(5), weights[weight]))

if __name__ == '__main__':

here is a script you can use to play around with the proposal and tweak parameters


Thanks for providing the functions to play around with, they were helpful.

One point to think about…we are optimising rewards allocations to pools based on TVL using somewhat complex formulas.
This may be harder to communicate to new-comers and the rest of community, which could be a stumbling block when they start asking “how are rewards allocated”, “why does this pool get this much”, etc.

It may be better from a marketing/growth perspective to use simple linear weights (and also, rounded percentages like 4.5%) instead of a function that produces fractional percentages to reduce communication frictions (unless you think specifically modelling diminishing allocations to higher TVLs with these convex functional forms is important, etc).

I see, I wrote up this document that might be able to help explain this. I really would appreciate anyones input here since I think some language might be confusing if we think this is a good path to go.

$PICKLE Emission Allocation

As pJar offerings expand it will become important to incentivize new jars to grow TVL, while still providing adequate incentive for existing TVL. Ideally this balance will promote new jars and best performing strategies.

Why this focus?

$PICKLE derives value from cash flows. One of the best ways to drive this value is to increase cash flow. This means more TVL, and higher APY in jars to receive more income from profit fees. All incentives are aligned here for jar users and pickle holders as higher APY and TVL benefit everyone.

New Jars

Increasing overall TVL is mainly a benefit for $PICKLE holders. Higher TVL means more profit to collect fees from. From a jar user perspective, higher TVL may also allow the rate of compounding to increase and marginally increase APY. Incentives for new jars will allow them to grow TVL more quickly.

High APY Jars

High APY jars benefits again all parties. Targeting emissions to high APY pools makes them even more attractive. These pools are already generating high profits and thus high fees as well. We will also want to grow TVL in these pools as they will generate the most fees.


We can define an adjustable function for determining the allocation of $PICKLE emissions to jars.
This function should strike a balance between incentiving high APY and low TVL jars as stated above.
The first step will be to target a jar size.
This jar size will be the size of “no rewards point”.
This value can always be updated as jars grow to ensure no jar ever reaches no rewards.
Using a transformed logarithmic function we can derive a multiplier for the “need” for TVL in this jar.
This value, multiplied by the jar’s APY will give a relative weight score for the jar.

Applied Approach

Using a target of $100 million USD per jar:

A base function can be derived from:

y = log(x)^2

This function produces a perfect inverse to the curve shape described above, with higher values at x = 0, and trail to 0 as x increases.

y = 1 - log(x)^2
Shift as x = 1 produces the maximum value.

y = 1 - log(x + 1)^2
log(100,000,000) = 8 // find desired x intersect
Calculate a value to replace 1 to ensure y = 0, x = 8.

y = 9 - log(x + 1)^2

Working Example

pool apy tvl
eth/dai lp 26.3% 11.8m
eth/usdt lp 19.7% 46m
eth/usdc lp 21.9% 29.5m
eth/wbtc lp 20.6% .247m
3pool 18% 1.1k
renBTC 9.2% 75.8k
sCRV 8% 10.3m

Given the above values and allocations for APY / TVL applying:

tvl = tvl / $10 million usd
weight = apy * (9 - log(tvl + 1)^2)
total_jar_weights = sum of all jar weight
allocation = % jar allocation * weight / total_jar_weights
68%  Liquidity Providers  
0.5% $PICKLE Stakers  
usdt : 3.78%  
wbtc : 5.81%  
scrv : 2.16%  
usdc : 4.95%  
dai  : 7.02%  
3pool: 5.15%  
ren  : 2.63%  

Allocation parameters for liquidity providers, and $PICKLE staking are subject to change and determined by vote.


Some amazing discussion here :metal:

I’ll comment in more detail later when on my laptop but one point I do agree with is lowering the Pickle-Eth share gradually over time to allow more jar incentives. And I say that as a predominantly Pickle-Eth farmer … I just think that TVL and ‘revenue’ from fees is a better long term goal and as @peitalin mentioned Pickle may be okay to lose some liquidity in return.


Incredible work on this. Thanks @jintao for the super-thorough write up! It looks like we’re talking about two separate (but related) ideas within this post: 1) The overall emission split between power pool and the rest of the system, and 2) The system we use to determine PICKLE emissions to each of the non-power pool farms.

Shortly after launch, the decision was made to shift distribution from 50% power pool to 75% power pool. This was controversial but proved to be the right move. I believe that our generosity towards pool 2 has been a huge part of the $PICKLE price stability.

That being said, does it make sense to start rolling these back now? I tend to think yes. For the first time, $PICKLE has utility outside of the power pool. This reduction in sell pressure could mean a reduced emission distribution to the power pool.

I’m a fan of all things gradual so I really like the suggestion above to start at just 5% (70/30 now) increase to jar farms.

@jintao - The mathematics of your suggestion are a bit outside the scope of my understanding. In lay terms, you’re suggesting a dynamic distribution mechanism intended to optimize for TVL – Is that correct? Assuming yes, this is something I’d been dreaming about. I’d love to discuss this a bit further with you and introduce some of the ideas I had, but I guess I’d like to get the dev teams thoughts on this first. @Larry_Cucumber, @BigBrainBriner - Would you guys be open to introducing a distribution system like the one @jintao has suggested here or do you think it’s too complex / too soon?

Thanks in advance,



I am also in favour of gradually reducing ETH/Pickle pool rewards and allocate them to the new jars. Starting with 5% weekly until we get to something like 50% (if liquidity does not drop drastically) sounds reasonable. I think we should first allocate most of it(or even all of it) to UNI-ETH/wBTC pool because it is the biggest on Uniswap and rewards will finish soon. Later the next reductions we could split it between other pools.

P.S. I am also a ETH-Pickle LP provider
P.S.S. I wanna thank all of community members and developers posting here and on discord. A lot of high quality content

Thanks for posting @sfychi and welcome to the forums!

I personally feel like 50% is too low for PICKLE / ETH, but I don’t have the math to support that.

There exists, at any given time, the optimal split between these two pools. Factors would be AUM (in each type of pool), $PICKLE price, new user acquisition rate, and recapitalization rate (folks in each type of pool will likely behave statistically differently as they accumulate $PICKLE (with those farming it from stables / Eth pairs more likely to farm and dump)).

This may sound like a load of hullabaloo, but I assure you that we are not immune to a death spiral if we don’t get our emission split right.

Unless we have an economic wiz kid who can whip something up, I think the best course of action is a sloww decrease and watchful eye on how the metrics respond.

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@jjdubs I agree that going to fast to 50% for PICKLE / ETH would be dangerous and counter productive. But if we do it slowly by 5% weekly or bi-weekly and analyzing its effects on liquidity would work fine. Also, in the future, after we have the audits in place, I think we might get listed on some pretty good exchanges and that would also help with the liquidity. Also the benefit of doing the reduction periodically is we could allocate the newly available PICKLEs to incentivize new hot/big/popular pools, boost their APYs and attracting more liquidity to our platform.

I actually like @jintao’s approach, but I think we as a community need more time to digest and refine it further. Since we want to get the TVL into our jars ASAP, it is probably best to move forward with a more simple and naiive approach for now.

First let’s take a look at how much TVL is in each jar. At the time of this posting, these are the numbers ordered by largest TVL to the lowest:

USDT/ETH:  $49,380,469.857    Rewards: 6.25%
USDC/ETH:  $27,816,715.611    Rewards: 6.25%
DAI/ETH:   $16,148,119.61     Rewards: 6.25%
sCRV:      $13,743,681.575    Rewards: 6.25%
WBTC/ETH:     $165,591.803
3poolCRV:     $132,657.719
renBTCCRV:     $64,463.282

Some things to note here:

  1. We don’t want to reduce the DAI/ETH farm rewards too much because they were only recently raised to an “even” amount with the USDT and USDC farms and likely still have room to grow, TVL-wise. So DAI/ETH’s 6.25% distribution should likely stay the same.

  2. sCRV farm rewards should not be lower than DAI/ETH, since the sCRV jar has a lower TVL than DAI/ETH, it stands to reason that we want to continue driving more TVL into the sCRV jar. The available liquidity on Curve for the sUSD pool is currently $94 million, so there’s definitely more liquidity that can flow in.

  3. The three new pools deserve the most rewards (proportionally) owing to how small their TVL is. I propose having these three receive equal amounts for now (we can revisit in the following week).

  4. Reducing ETH/PICKLE rewards from 75% to 70% is prudent, it’s not that big of a cut but it’s enough to give us a lot more room to incentivize jar participation. We’ll have to see how ETH/PICKLE liquidity reacts to this and we might have to course correct in the future, but I’d say a 5% reduction right now is acceptable.

  5. We can likely significantly lower USDT and USDC rewards without much issue because the vast majority of the APY for those pools come from the jar strategies rather than the farming rewards.

My proposed rewards split:

USDT/ETH:  $49,380,469.857    Rewards: 3.5%
USDC/ETH:  $27,816,715.611    Rewards: 3.5%
DAI/ETH:   $16,148,119.61     Rewards: 4%
sCRV:      $13,743,681.575    Rewards: 4%
WBTC/ETH:     $165,591.803    Rewards: 5%
3poolCRV:     $132,657.719    Rewards: 5%
renBTCCRV:     $64,463.282    Rewards: 5%

This adds up to the 30% that would be left over after the ETH/PICKLE pool gets its 70% share. Admittedly, this is a very arbitrary split but it makes the numbers a little easier to work with and it’s also relatively intuitive for people to understand.

This also puts the focus entirely on TVL while completely neglecting APY. I made this conscious choice because I believe certain jars to be saturated and would not need to keep receiving a lot of PICKLE rewards to make sure people stay in them. The rewards given for these pools should therefore be the minimum such that those people won’t want to leave.

Let me know what you guys think.


Good morning!

I see a lot of well thought out proposals in this thread which is awesome!

I really like @jintao 's idea of dynamic rebalancing. However, I think that is something we can look at a little further down the line…the DeFi space is evolving so quickly and we need to maintain flexibility to redirect rewards based on market developments at this time imo.

@BigBrainBriner do we have a ballpark ETA on being whitelisted by Curve ? The reason I ask is because that should determine how we currently split rewards between the UNI and Curve pools.

At the current CRV price of ~0.55, it is extremely cheap to attain the 2.5x max boost on 3pool:
Each $10K invested requires 418 CRV (4 year lockup) - $230/10K or 2.3%

ren is not bad either:
Each BTC invested requires 520 CRV (4 year lockup) - $290/11K or 2.6%

sUSD is still relatively expensive, so we’re good there:
Each $10K invested requires 1760 CRV (4 year lockup) - $970/10K or 9.7%

Based on the above, I think it is unlikely that we will attract significant TVL to the 3pool and renBTC Jars until we get whitelisted. Similarly, sUSD TVL should remain stable as gas-efficient harvesting is one of the main reasons folks use our Jars, although we have seen about $2M in incremental TVL in pJar0a since we increased its rewards to 6.25%, a gain of ~20%. Nonetheless, I think a decent allocation to the renBTC pool is logical, as we’re trying to target a different audience there (OG Bitcoiners, if you will).

So with that being said, I think we should focus our current efforts on attracting maximum TVL to the Uniswap jars, considering that the initial UNI mining run ends on November 17. Also, UNI may introduce more pools and other changes after October 17 as the initial 30 day window closes.

I am currently 100% in the Power Pool but happy to support a cut to 70% for the greater good.

I propose the following split, to be revisited upon getting on the coveted whitelist:

USDT/ETH - 3.5%
USDC/ETH - 3.5%
DAI/ETH - 5%
sCRV - 4.5%
WBTC/ETH - 5.5%
3poolCRV - 3%
renBTCCRV - 5%
Pickle/ETH - 70%

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I’ll offer a “contrarian” idea. Personally, as a PICKLE–ETH LP and a self-proclaimed econ whizkid, I’d not reduce the rewards to the “Pickle stabilization pool”, several reasons:

  • The effects of .9 on the $PICKLE emission compounded over the next 50 weeks would be further compounded with the reduction in the allocation of rewards to the main $PICKLE holding and liquidity mechanism, plus competing strategies for ETH holders, and staking of PICKLE (which is illiquid). It would be hard to model all these variables as-is, but if you think in terms of simple trade-offs, I’d encourage things that increase those utility providers “most long” on $PICKLE. You’d be hard-pressed to find more value than adding liquidity to $PICKLE itself and stabilizing its price. Remember, the value of $PICKLE as stable rewards vs. less-stable rewards affects the incentivization power of all other strategies and jars.
  • Let us not be casual about incentives to $PICKLE-ETH. Some have suggested taking 5% weekly until the rewards are 50%. :sneezing_face: Some have compared with $YFI which is a wildly swinging coin now that rewards are all dry. Put yourself in the shoe of what the average big $PICKLE farmer is going to do when the APY is in the low double or single digits. Pray you have product-market fit by then. Don’t try to rush this decay. Perhaps it’s easy to forget this is an experimental protocol — it’s a very costly lack of judgement, though. Why not flip this on its head and actually do gradual experiments with the incentives of the other jars, and see if the hypothesis hold. Before going all-in giving the new jars “permanent” incentives, just give them anything, see if that moves the TVL, see if it’s worth it. It’s OK to rock the boat. It’s not OK to shoot oneself in the foot.
  • Of all the jars proposed, I see the WBTC/ETH as outside the scope of “off peg bad, on peg good”. A corollary of the mission should be “off mission bad, on mission good”. Just not incentivizing that pool by the percentages most have suggested would allow PICKLE-ETH to keep its 75%. Let’s not help $BTC at the expense of $PICKLE. There is such a thing as “bad TVL” (a trade-off with “good TVL”).

I am in favour of dynamically allocating rewards, adjusting them week-over-week. I think technically, there’s no shortage of talent to do it. Efforts should be focused there. The issue would be, the friction of the 0.5% withdrawal fee. However, it could be replaced with a smaller “inter-pool” swapping fee that would presumably have much more volume in times of volatility.

Also, keep in mind, TVL follows APY all things equal, not the other way around. Think of causation.

A lot of good things will be happening to Pickle that will boost TVL: audit, Curve whitelisting, subgraph and all that flows from there.

Stay safe and happy farming!


While this is contrarian, it does not offer any solutions. Please propose a distribution that aligns with your thoughts or there cannot be progress on any of your points.