How should community proposals evolve into Pickle Improvement Proposals (PIPs). AKA "wen dao?"

Within several days of launching, a proposal was created to terminate all pickle rewards after 200,000 had been distributed.

There were several issues with this proposal:

  1. By the time the proposal could be implemented, more than 200,000 pickles would have been minted.
  2. There were, at the same time, two other contradictory proposals that had more support, and
  3. This would have knee capped our ability to continue to generate interest through pickle farming.

I mention this, not to rehash the past, but to exemplify the need for a clear governance process.

Many other protocols create a high barrier of entry before proposals can be put to the community. This is done through minimum token holdings, proof of community support through a forum vote, and perhaps other methods as well. For us, the filter has thus far been our development team who ultimately have held the keys.

As we plan to transition to a platform that is entirely self-governed, we need to refine our process before we can really implement any other major changes.

I do not have the answers, but I wanted to at least get the ball rolling. What do you guys think? How do we shepherd the transition to self-governance? How do we protect against sybil attacks? What checkpoints should exist along the way?


Yeah I definitely think a more staged approach makes sense here. What I think would be cool is something like this:

  1. People throw around ideas on Discord
  2. When they get serious about it, people will start having long-form discussions on this forum
  3. And when there is enough momentum, we can have a PIP specific discussion on this forum (w/ a PIP number and all that)
  4. And finally, we can have a vote on Snapshot to kind of formalize the intention of the community

Subsequent to that, the devs (and whatever stakeholders) will execute the proposal. Thoughts?


This approach makes sense to me - governance proposals should not be a free for all as they are open to manipulation - the example of Sushi voting to spend $14m ETH on a buyback springs to mind. Was put forward by someone (an eager mod/multisig holder as it happens), clearly voted for by whales who wanted to take advantage - something the quadratic voting helps with but does not remove, but also by the community who interpreted it as a way to make the price pump (which obvisously it did not nor was ever intended to). There wasn’t even a set of criteria in place at the time to determine whether it should pass or not. To me it was an expensive example of how community governance can go wrong if it is not carefully considered and interpretation removed.

For step 3), ie who can create a PIP and why, and what criteria mean it passes to step 4?

Step 4) needs criteria in place that dictate when a Snapshot PIP vote passes - a minimum quorum?

And final step … is what happens if the multisig holders unanimously disagree with a community vote - does it get passed or not?

Basically, need to take interpretation out of the mix as much as possible.


Getting a PIP: Some of the mods originally suggested using the polling feature here to determine whether a proposal should get a PIP number or not. I have yet to make up my mind about that but it seems worth exploring.

Quorum: I think there was actually stuff relating to a quorum originally but it was removed, but I don’t recall why and how. Maybe @0xpenguin can chime in on that here.

Unanimous Disagreement:
It is unlikely that the entire core dev team would disagree with a particular proposal that has broad community support. Especially since we are extremely invested in the outcome of this project both financially, emotionally, and temporally.

As you astutely pointed out, it’s important to have some kind of backstop to the tyranny of loud whales. Sushi had a unique challenge there because the event happened after the scandal (when much of the trust in the project and its founder(s) was lost). We hope we never come to that point.


Good points!

I’ll add one myself.

I’m not sure if it’s even possible in snapshot, but the way voted pickles are displayed might be difficult to interpreted because they are derived from the lp tokens. I think some kind of conversion to actual pickles might help people to see what’s actually happening.

Proposal rights needs to be in the interest of the protocol. For example if there was a quorum to destroy the product and exit for profits. In that respect, I think there should be some agreed guidelines on what can be tabled as a proposal that is of benefit to the protocol vs individuals seeking short term profit.

In this way we can then be more relaxed on voting rights, if there is a higher bar for proposal rights.