[RFC] Cross-chain emissions redistribution

Good points. Got me to change my mind. If there was more assurance that the team would be prioritizing profitability/token appreciation over just emitting Pickle then A would be my choice but as you stated in your write up, their current track record in less than stellar in that regard. At least if the community votes on weights there is a chance that lockening wars occur which would increase token price.

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That’s the instruction on the tin. If Yearn jarns don’t earn enough in fees, you can add 0.5% entry or exit fee. Or advertise them to get more TVL. So far, Pickle protocol is fairly silent on Twitter about offering industry leading rates. Top farms should be advertised on Twitter every week to attract users and dilute the whales’ rewards. Pickle finance twitter with 22k followers keeps twitting about Polygon Galactic Grand Prix, AMA with someone unrelated and NFTs, but keeps 56.6% APY on stables, 118.3% APY on ETH-USD, 15% on ETH/stETH and 1600% ETH/DINO DeFi’s best kept secret. Tell everyone about these yields. Invite more whales, get them to lock DILL, don’t chase whales away. Make them fight for higher APY on their favorite farms.

I agree, 0.5 % deposit fee doesn’t solve the problem though. In the example of the yearn jars they just have to stay long enough in the jars and you still subsidize them.

that’s why they should have boosts and voting power over emissions. Otherwise pickle or dill holders sponsor a farm and dump scheme with a governance token that barely does anything. You shift emissions to other chains and there isn’t even any boost there.

The whole purpose of emissions on other chains is to boost the liquidity. If you don’t offer a certain incentive to use the platform, the launch is likely dead from the start. The general problem is that people and users have a certain bias for a network or a specific platform and they tend to overweight their already known choices. I don’t want to change the whole system, I just want to reduce the ETH emissions from 0.2 pickle to 0.1 pickle and give the other networks a fair chance. The users can still vote on the distribution of the 0.1 pickles per block etc. The proposed ETH distribution is a clear overweight for a network that isn’t growing significantly in value anymore because most users can’t afford it anymore.

veToken has been designed in a way that almost can’t be gamed, you increase emissions in one farm and anyone can use it. I don’t recall veCRV governance riding on the training wheels with CRV holders being babysitted by a centralized authority.

Before the CVX launch Yearn gamed it heavily, they even do it right now with the bribes. And the yearn users didn’t decide about the votes, the Yearn devs did.

nobody owns a farm, everyone can join. The instruction for a user to pump their favorite token farm is: stop dumping PICKLE, lock and vote. Advertise farms, get people to lock DILL, dilute the whales.

This is not the point. If you are a whale you tend to farm more pickles than the average user. As a consequence you earn more pickles and voting power than the average user over the same period of time. The influence of the whales increases over time.

nobody owns a farm, everyone can join. The instruction for a user to pump their favorite token farm is: stop dumping PICKLE, lock and vote. Advertise farms, get people to lock DILL, dilute the whales.

you can vote once for 10-20 USD and keep your vote like that forever. The token design makes it a preferred option because if you voted every week, your share would get diluted over time.

It makes sense if you have a decent stack. If you change the voting weight for 0.1%, what do you really change?

By smaller users do you mean farm-and-dump users that have no DILL?

Pickle shouldn’t be a 2 class system

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Thanks.
Just to be clear, I don’t blame the Core Team. We’re at the cutting edge of weird tech. Polygon RPC is broken. The reaction to this issue has been slow (actually, Polygon farms and jars still don’t work and don’t have instruction how to use them).
The point I was trying to get across is - if users can’t enter the farms, on Thursday we vote to reduce emissions to 0 till the access to these farms is fixed. Having money at stake makes you act quick.

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We can split Pickle in 2:

Capitalism edition pickle where you get 30% apy of your deposit. That means big depositors earn a lot and small depositors earn less. 1 DILL = 1 vote

Communist edition pickle where every user gets 1000 USDC regardless of deposit size. 1 wallet - 1 vote

Game on! :slight_smile:

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as per other comments - fine, increase the fee for stables, add an extra yearly management fee or remove them altogether, but only with permissions of DILL holders.
If you have DILL, you don’t want expansion to new chain be a fail. We’re all aligned.
ETH mainchain has enough liquidity hostages to bring profits with 0 emissions.
I think CRV is a success story. I don’t think we should replace voting with babysitting (which is necessary till right tools are developed).

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Thank you everyone for the spirited discussion! :pray: In view of the discussion and the non-binding vote, I urge us to proceed with a vote so we can finalize our expansion to Arbitrum (development has completed and this vote is all that is pending). I personally support proceeding with Proposal A.

@JimmyJ Under proposal A, 66% of the emissions (going towards income-earning farms) stay on Ethereum mainnet, with only 33% going towards L2s - this 33% not strictly controlled by DILL is what’s at issue here. Let’s put aside the allocation for liquidity incentives for now, because I don’t think anyone disagrees that we need PICKLE liquidity on whatever chain we expand to, and the absolute amounts were agreed upon by a proper DILL vote.

I understand the hesistance about power creep of the Core Team, but there are sufficient checks and balances in place such that proceeding with proposal A doesn’t come close to bringing the centralization that some fear. As @Cipio mentioned, the DAO can always submit proposals to adapt to changing circumstances, where DILL votes reign supreme. We’re not perfect by any means, but the team listens and has never once gone against the wishes of the majority (e.g. we accept that the OKEx proposal was imperfect and so we’re trying to improve this time around instead of shoehorning things through). The issue with the Polygon RPC was also never meant to artificially suppress participation and once I learned about the severity of it from your post, I followed up with a change to the frontend and an announcement.

Lastly, proposal A doesn’t merely vest purely discretionary power in the Core Team - decisions are subject to oversight by the SCCOC (and so this proposal expands its mandate a little). The SCCOC was established as an extention of the DAO to be able to act swiftly in time-sensitive situations in situations such as hiring. The issue of cross-chain incentives is another time-sensitive decision
and it would be detrimental to be grid-locked by extensive governance discussion every time a change is required (some of you may recall the times before DILL where much ink was spilt over whether BTC or 3CRV should get 1% more emissions). The SCCOC comprises mostly elected members under PIP-44 where all the members are substantial DILL holders and incentives are aligned to act to ultimately boost Pickle TVL and revenue.

While I agree that the cross-chain voting of Proposal C is a very worthwhile venture, I don’t want to rush to make any promises before the system is thoroughly discussed and resources can be allocated to its development. Let’s definitely keep this on the radar while we proceed to expand the protocol and capitalize on the highest-yielding opportunities available to us at this time :muscle:

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Excellent work with the Arbitrum deployment!

I agree with our leader’s comments. Very well put.

My primary point was to make sure people remain excited about PICKLE and DILL. Lock, vote, deposit, boost.
My comments about the decentralization are just arguments I have used to support the above point.

The Polygon issues were resolved very fast, very impressive :muscle:. I’ll take this opportunity to reiterate that it was an accidental turn of events that combining farms and jars into 1 page removed the instruction to use custom RPCs.

I agree that the issue of emissions on other chains is time sensitive. I agree that it’s very early to talk about Proposal C.

The way I read the SCCOC proposal, it has been meant to have a narrow mandate of dealing with hiring decisions, not to decide about emissions and farm weights. The bios presented were tailored to dealing with people and not with markets. The liquidity mining incentives are completely unrelated to hiring and I would rather see market makers and liquidity providers overseeing that. DILL is a more natural fit to oversee emissions.

Because Arbitrum and Okex launch are coming soon, DAO can grant the Core Team freedom to arrange liquidity rewards as they see fit for x time. Then I think B would be most suitable, based on how the chains perform - how much fees they generate and how much potential they have.

Meanwhile the core team can think about proposal C and when appropriate, communicate the thoughts and feasible options.

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