[RFC] ve(3,3)PICKLE aka (3,3)DILL

Turned to PIP-49 – Vote : Snapshot

A governance call has been held to explain the proposal: [Recording] ve(3,3)PICKLE Tokenomics Community Call

author(s): @larry_cucumber, @leekuanjew, @cipio


  • As market volatility batters the DeFi 1.0 v DeFi 2.0 narrative, Larry the Cucumber has signalled a clear focus on revenues for Pickle as a DeFi OG protocol.
  • This proposal was inspired by Andre’s ve(3,3) tokenomics1 for Solidly, a model likely to be implemented on cousin projects Yearn and Keeper. If this proposal passes, the ve tokenomics created by Curve and already adopted by Pickle will be improved to:
    • clearly frame the utility of $DILL locking as a claim on Pickle revenues: present and future.
    • reduce dilutive pressure on $DILL lockers.
    • dynamically reduce $PICKLE emissions as $DILL adoption increases.
  • These enhancements will be accomplished by:
    • switching the revenue-sharing token to $ETH (either native or wrapped ERC-20) for $DILL distributions.
    • on top of $ETH from revenue-sharing, adding a second anti-dilutive reward of $PICKLE (either naked or vested $vPICKLE) to $DILL distributions.
    • introducing dynamic (3,3) emissions i.e. as $DILL supply increases as a % of $PICKLE total supply, emissions will decrease.
  • This proposal contains two parts:
    • (I) Tokenomics enhancements, summarised above.
    • (II) Treasury restructuring, summarised below.
    • Governance discussion is needed to determine if both parts will be voted on together or separately.
  • The proposed tokenomics changes should be accompanied by a restructuring of the Treasury, as follows:
    • 100% of Protocol revenues to be sent to $DILL lockers.
    • Governance to authorise a mint representing a 100% increase in locked $PICKLE supply for the main Treasury address.
    • Treasury to max lock all newly-minted $PICKLEs for $DILL, thus attaining at least 50% of all $DILL (if everyone max-locks).
    • Treasury to use $ETH received in $DILL distributions for development, bounties, operations, marketing & growth, $CORN buybacks, periodic $PICKLE buybacks, etc – as per the budget approved in PIP-44, under the oversight of the SCCOC.
    • Treasury to use $PICKLEs received in anti-dilutive $DILL rewards for the following authorised purposes:
      • for strategic initiatives, approved by the SCCOC.
      • to build a reserve of $PICKLEs for future use or protocol-owned liquidity, deployed with SCCOC approval.
      • to re-lock in $DILL, in order to defend its % of ownership, with the advice and consent of the SCCOC.
    • Treasury to periodically sell reserve $PICKLE on the market as options to community members, CowSwap style, with Governance consent.
    • Treasury to progressively decentralise the Protocol, increasing the % of $PICKLE in the hands of community members.


Part I, Section 1: Revenue-sharing for $DILL in $ETH

  • At present, revenue-sharing is done by buying $PICKLEs from the market with revenues, which are distributed using the FeeDistributor contract.2
  • When implemented, the Pickle Protocol had buybacks as part of its value-capture design, so the community believed $PICKLE to be the most appropriate fee token. This version of “ve” tokenomics differed from the original veCRV from Curve, which uses $3CRV (a Curve LP position made of the three major stablecoins, essentially a “yield-bearing dollar”) as a fee token, yet basically, every other protocol that adopted “ve” tokenomics after Pickle used our design (using the native token as the fee token), that is until Andre’s ve(3,3).
  • The reason ve(3,3) recommends a non-native token is to avoid volatility affecting the status of the fee token as passive income. The idea of ve(3,3) is to go beyond making the governance token an “interest-bearing asset” but providing lockers with a clear “claim on fee ownership” which requires ownership percentages that can be easily defended, a token with wide utility as the fee token, and a mechanism to make locking collectively desirable.
  • Over our time using $PICKLE as the fee token, we have found that the effects of buybacks to be temporary and only accrue to the most sophisticated traders, whereas most lockers end up absorbing the $PICKLE volatility, which makes it harder to use $DILL as a tool for passive income.
  • Using $ETH as the fee token instead of $PICKLE makes sense as the first step towards ve(3,3)PICKLE. Harking back to the time of “$PICKLE gives you $ETH”, the idea would be to create demand for $PICKLE not from buybacks, but because they represent a claim rights to a steady (or even better, a growing) stream of a highly sought-after, hyper-liquid, ultra-high utility token like $ETH. As $ETH is much less volatile than $PICKLE, a user may even be incentivised to increase his “percentage of ownership” in the Protocol by buying $PICKLEs back with their $ETH in order to increase their lock amounts.
What would you prefer as the new fee token for $DILL distributions?
  • $WETH or $ETH (pending feasibility)
  • a stablecoin (suggest in comments)
  • something else (e.g. pickling $stETHcrv or $ETH-$USDC UNI-V3 LP)

0 voters

Part I, Section 2: Anti-dilutive $PICKLE rewards for $DILL

  • users will continue to receive $PICKLE rewards for depositing into $DILL
  • these rewards will not come from $PICKLE buybacks (tho may occasionally do so as “special dividends”), but rather from “anti-dilutive” emissions.
  • dill.totalSupply / pickle.totalSupply3 4 of adjusted emissions will go to $DILL holders every week, the rest going to farms. Auxiliary contracts may be needed to obtain these parameters precisely or the implementation may involve averaging these parameters over the course of an epoch via off-chain scripting. Implementation details left to Core team.
  • to mitigate impact to farms, emissions will be set to 0.15 picklePerBlockas new initial state of the system.5
  • dual rewards (revenue-sharing + anti-dilutive) managed by a new FeeDistributorV2 contract, to be developed by the Core team should this proposal pass.
  • borrowing from Olympus’s original (3,3), there is the possibility to add a time delay to these anti-dilutive $PICKLEs so they’re even less likely to be dumped right away. Using a contract called VestedERC20.sol, $PICKLE can be wrapped into $vPICKLE, which is at the same time transferrable and linearly vesting $PICKLE (say over the course of 5 days).
  • Of note, using $vPIKCLE would add significantly more complexity as we would have to create $vPICKLEs with the right expiry for every distribution of anti-dilutive rewards. The user would also need to pay a transaction to redeem the underlying $PICKLEs, likely using Etherscan. The decision is up to the DAO.
What version of $PICKLE would you prefer as anti-dilutive rewards?
  • $PICKLE, naked originals.
  • $vPICKLE, 5-day vested.
  • something else (suggest in comments)

0 voters

Part I, Section 3: Dynamic $PICKLE emissions

  • to fully enable (3,3) dynamics, $PICKLE emissions will decrease as $DILL increases relative to $PICKLE. A fixed emissions parameter will be adjusted with the formula adjusted_emissions = emissions * ( 1 - ( dill.totalSupply / pickle.totalSupply )).
  • This means if all $PICKLEs are max-locked, adjusted_emissions will be zero. Conversely, if no $PICKLEs are locked, adjusted_emissions will equal emissions. This encourages everyone to collaborate and lock for $DILL in order to reduce emissions and create positive pressure on the $PICKLE price.
  • it will be very important to accurately decide on the parameters dill.totalSupply and pickle.totalSupply the purposes of adjusted emissions (and the % of adjusted emissions going to $DILL and Farms). Auxiliary contracts may be needed to obtain these parameters precisely or the implementation may involve averaging these parameters over the course of an epoch via off-chain scripting. Implementation details left to Core team.

Part II, Section 1: 100% Revenue-sharing for $DILL

  • fundamental to Treasury restructuring is about building an ever more resilient protocol.
  • currently, when locking for $DILL, you are eligible for 45% of the revenues Pickle generates, distributed weekly. Ideally, that number should be 100%.
  • other revenue-focused protocols like Curve, LooksRare, and Solidly give 100% of revenues to those locking or staking the governance token, which is also the essence of ve(3,3).

Part II, Section 2: The Treasury $DILL

  • In order for the Treasury to maintain the current level of development in the protocol under a 100% revenue-sharing paradigm, it needs to hold a position in $DILL. However, the Treasury does not have an extensive reserve of $PICKLEs to lock since $PICKLE was fairly launched. The option to mint a reserve for the Treasury lays (and has always laid) in the hands of the community.
  • If this proposal passes, Pickle will carry a strategic mint (its very first), in order for the Treasury to control 50% of locked $PICKLEs as $DILL and thus receive 50% of the governance rewards. At present, almost 1M $PICKLEs are locked for $DILL, ergo this proposal would authorise the mint of as many $PICKLEs as will be locked for $DILL on the day the proposal passes (1M $PICKLEs in this example).
  • $PICKLEs minted under this proposal will not reach the market, instead, they will be “perma-locked” (max-locked and extended to max-lock periodically) in order for the Treasury to control a minimum of half of the max $DILL supply (what $DILL supply would be if everyone locked extends to max).
  • Thus, after locking for $DILL, the Treasury would receive two rewards every week: revenue-sharing rewards (say, in $ETH), and anti-dilutive rewards (say, in $PICKLE).
  • The Treasury will use its $ETH from revenue-sharing (the “$DILL distributions”) to finance the Protocol’s development, bounties, operations, and marketing & growth i.e. continuing business as usual as per the budget approved in PIP-44, which will continue to be deployed under the oversight of the SCCOC. The Treasury will continue to carry out weekly $CORN buybacks at the same level of revenues, and also carry out periodic $PICKLE buybacks when market conditions justify them, and either hold them in reserve or distribute them as “special dividends”.
  • The Treasury will also receive $PICKLEs from anti-dilutive $DILL rewards, and this proposal restricts the Treasury in using these $PICKLEs for only the following authorised purposes:
    • strategic initiatives like co-marketing, bootstrapping pool-2s of $PICKLE, seeding liquidity in CEXs, et al – any such “strategic initiative” will have to be approved by the SCCOC through its normal resolution procedure before the $PICKLEs can be appropriated.
    • the Treasury may choose to build a reserve of $PICKLEs for the purposes of providing $PICKLE Grants for contributors, paying bonuses, or for building protocol-owned liquidity – any such deployment of $PICKLEs in reserve will have to be approved by the SCCOC.
    • to re-lock in $DILL, in order to defend its share of entitlement to revenues. This will be done with the advice and consent of the SCCOC as the community may wish for the Treasury to reduce its percentage of ownership as the Protocol grows and achieves better economies of scale.
  • The Treasury may periodically sell reserve $PICKLEs on the market as options to community members by passing a Proposal for each particular “Exit to Community” round. The current thinking around this is to borrow a page from the CowSwap $COW options which were offered to the community first and where terms were never worse for community members than for professional investors.
  • The Treasury may divide its $DILL holdings over several wallets, in order to support differentiated locks. The Governance may vote to allow any of these locks to expire and decide on the fate of the $PICKLEs once they unlock (e.g. using them for fundraising via an “Exit to Community” round).
  • Over time, the Treasury will act to realise the strategic vision of Pickle which is to progressively decentralise the Protocol. For the Treasury, this means increasing the percentage of $PICKLE in the hands of community members and reducing its own entitlement to Protocol revenues by reducing its share of the $DILL supply. This progressive decentralisation will be achieved via a combination of grants, special dividends, and community fundraising rounds.


  • On the dynamic $PICKLE emissions: a good reminder that Farms/Gauges (distributing $PICKLE rewards for staking Jar positions) are not going to go away. The likelihood of the whole $PICKLE supply being max-locked for $DILL is virtually zero. The (3,3) system aims to create positive price dynamics as $DILL grows relative to $PICKLE, which should make Farms/Gauges more attractive (higher $PICKLE price → higher rewards).
  • On the Treasury $DILL reform: please note that what is being proposed is not to double the totalSupply of $PICKLE, but to give the Treasury 50% of all locked $PICKLEs, therefore the mint will be equivalent to the amount of $PICKLEs currently locked for $DILL. Once the Treasury locks these $PICKLEs, the Treasury will have at least 50% of the $DILL supply and thus get at least 50% of the revenues generated by the Protocol (at the beginning, decentralisation should be expected over time).
  • Should only Part I pass, the PIPs for pool 2 (PIP-46) and cross-chain emissions (PIP-45) will remain in force, otherwise, they will be deprecated by this PIP.
  • Unlike Andre’s ve(3,3), no changes are proposed to the DILL contract itself. Changing the DILL contract to support transferable locks (as “veNFTs”) would require a token migration and redeployment of large swaths of the Pickle Protocol, a majorly expensive effort (that would break composability too) with a very small payoff especially given the upcoming launch of VeToken Finance.
  • The proposed Treasury restructuring does not affect the “community-owned” nature of the Pickle Protocol. Those in oversight of the Treasury are not in the business of voting for proposals that the community clearly dislikes or does not support. As far as voting for proposals, the Treasury will always abstain or vote with the community consensus unless its intervention is needed to foil a governance attack.

Topics for Discussion

Use of $ETH vs $WETH for revenue-sharing $DILL distributions

  • there are safety advantages in using $ETH as a revenue-distribution (fee) token as $ETH is not subject to “bad approval” attacks i.e. can only be stolen from your wallet by compromised private keys
  • $ETH transfers are much cheaper than ERC-20 transfers
  • $ETH can be used for swapping in Uniswap & forks without approvals
  • the downside is $ETH must be wrapped for some uses for example CowSwap
  • another limiting factor is the complexity of supporting $ETH as FeeDistributor.sol code has already been battle-tested using ERC-20.

Use of naked $PICKLE vs $vPICKLE for anti-dilution rewards for $DILL lockers

  • use of VestingERC20.sol contract presents opportunities to simply implement more (3,3)-style tokenomics
  • whereas $PICKLE can be immediately dumped, a $vPICKLE with 5-day or 7-day linear vesting would not have dumping liquidity.
  • vesting period need not be excessively long, only long enough to avoid immediate sell pressure but short enough to allow for re-locking before next epoch.
  • may be over-complication with little benefit, benefits of OHM-style bonding unclear.
  • will make it more expensive to use anti-dilution rewards as $vPICKLE must be redeemed to $PICKLE by spending gas.

Status of $CORN

  • whether only Part I, both Part I & II, or neither passes, $CORN will continue to be be subjected to a plan of buyback-and-burn, followed by direct redemption, until completely retired.
  • however, this proposal presents a big opportunity to give extra to either original hack victims, current $CORN holders, or both.
  • passing Part II in particular presents an opportunity to airdrop $PICKLE to the groups in question, or other initiatives, so they can too enjoy the benefits of ve(3,3)PICKLE-nomics.


  • Part I:
    • a FeeDistributorV2 contract to be developed by the Core team, supporting two tokens as claimable rewards:
      • $ETH (or $WETH or something else the DAO decides) as revenue-sharing rewards, coming from fees generated by the protocol.
      • $PICKLE (or $vPICKLE or something other wrapper the DAO decides)
    • Pickle UI to change to integrate FeeDistributorV2 dual rewards (claims of old rewards in FeeDistributor will still be supported).
      • FeeDistributor to be “deprecated”, claims allowed but no further $PICKLE transfers there by Governance. FeeDistributor.kill_me() won’t be called as then claims would be disallowed and all $PICKLEs are returned to Treasury – the emergency_return address.
    • MasterChef.setPicklePerBlock(adjusted_emissions) to be called by Governance.
    • Core team will develop auxiliary contracts or an off-chain scripting solution to calculate the split of $PICKLE emissions between anti-dilutive rewards (sent to FeeDistributorV2 for distribution) and the Gauge System as well as sidechain MiniChefs, giving $DILL a share according to the formula: dill\_emissions\_share = \frac{dill.totalSupply}{pickle.totalSupply}
    • Core team will develop auxiliary contracts or an off-chain scripting solution to transform emissions into adjusted_emissions using the ve(3,3) formula: adjusted\_emissions = emissions * ( 1 - ( \frac{dill.totalSupply}{pickle.totalSupply} ))
  • Part II:
    • PickleToken.mint(_to, _amount) to be called by Governance via MasterChef.
      • _to will be the Treasury address.
      • _amount will be 100% of the number of $PICKLE locked in $DILL on the block this proposal passes.
      • All $PICKLE tokens in possession of the Treasury address will then be locked directly or though a proxy contract (in order to support multiple locks) by calling VotingEscrow.create_lock(_value, _unlock_time) with _value being the total amount of each lock and _unlock_time 4 years.


1 These tokenomics were described in a series of three Medium articles, the first of which can be found here: ve(3,3). Quick article to explain how a… | by Andre Cronje | Medium.

2 Currently, revenue-sharing is done via the FeeDistributor contract. This contract receives $PICKLE and calculates how much of it is owed to each $DILL locker and when it will be claimable based on “epoch” logic. This refers to users needing to be locked for a full epoch to receive rewards therein, with a new $DILL epoch starting every Thursday at 0000 UTC. Anyone can deposit $PICKLEs in the contract but only Governance has a reason to. Governance calls the contract to mark “checkpoints”, which the contract conforms to the epoch logic as it checks block.timestamp. Since this contract references VotingEscrow, the $DILL locking contract, “deprecating” it in favour of another contract that does the same thing but uses another token for distributions is totally possible.

3 In this proposal, dill and VotingEscrow will be used interchangeably to refer to the same contract at: 0xbBCf169eE191A1Ba7371F30A1C344bFC498b29Cf.

4 In this proposal, pickle and PickleToken will be used interchangeably to refer to the same contract at:0x429881672B9AE42b8EbA0E26cD9C73711b891Ca5.

5 The 0.15 picklePerBlock emissions represent a theoretical maximum. For example, under current conditions, adjusted emissions = 0.15 * (1 - 781k/3M) = 0.111, with roughly half of these going to the gauges, the portion vulnerable to “farm and dump” remains virtually unchanged.

Temperature Check for ve(3,3)PICKLE
  • Proceed to Proposal
  • Do Nothing

0 voters

LOVE these ideas. On the token mint, is this a correct summary?

We will clean up revenue sharing by minting enough pickles and locking for Dill that 100% of revenue goes to Dill Holders (technically adding a big Dill holder) while keeping the same percentages we have currently? And the Dill owned by Pickle wouldn’t vote, would join consensus, or prevent a crazy governance attack depending on the needs.


Yes, that’s correct.


How long would it take to implement from the time DAO says “go?”

IMO it’s not that clear what problems we’re aiming to solve with this group of proposals. I wonder if a simpler proposal can accomplish many of the goals? Maybe these are all needed to accomplish the goals, would help to describe that more.

For example, we could likely start distributing the fees in ETH without needing to change the tokenomics or fee sharing structure? Would take a new contract AFAIK but otherwise is just a shift in how 0xAnon processes the treasury’s income?

Reading between the lines, it seems like a goal is to make locking for DILL more attractive via 2 mechanisms - diluting any pickle that isn’t locked as DILL (whether in wallets, pending in masterchef, or in LPs), and giving users more stability by paying out in ETH instead of native.

1 Like

Thanks for your comment here, @Bayes.

I will expand on this point:

  • This proposal was inspired by Andre’s ve(3,3) tokenomics for Solidly, a model likely to be implemented on cousin projects Yearn and Keeper. If this proposal passes, the ve tokenomics created by Curve and already adopted by Pickle will be improved to:
  • clearly frame the utility of $DILL locking as a claim on Pickle revenues: present and future.
  • reduce dilutive pressure on $DILL lockers.
  • dynamically reduce $PICKLE emissions as $DILL adoption increases.

So there are 3 mechanisms, the 2 you mentioned, and the giving to $DILL holders of $PICKLE (besides $ETH from revenue-sharing) that they can use it to defend their percentage of ownership.

The problems we identified were:

  • $DILL’s utility as a passive income generator was affected by the volatility of the $PICKLE token, which combined with gas costs on Ethereum made it difficult for people to believe in our $DILL yield long-term since they cannot claim rewards every week.
  • Pickle revenue growth and $DILL yield were disconnected due to $DILL dilution from farms. $DILL holders needed to either farm $PICKLE themselves or buy $PICKLEs from the market from farm-and-dump users to maintain their “share-of-$DILL” and thus their proportional claim on growing revenues.
  • There is no mechanism for “a road to zero emissions” or emissions reduction other than voting and proposing a new $PICKLE emissions rate, which is time-consuming to manage.
  • The $DILL utility is to share 45% of revenues, whereas other ve models share 100% of revenues. 100% revenue-sharing sends the right signal to potential $DILL holders.
  • The Treasury is constantly short on $PICKLEs and we are losing on collabs to other protocols due to our limitations in bringing incentives to the table. We can buy back the $PICKLEs but we have a tight budget given market conditions.

I was building this proposal since before reading ve(3,3), however, reading ve(3,3) did allow me to put my thoughts into a coherent system. This proposal was conceived before Solidly’s launch (even before Solidly’s spec was announced) and only aims to apply the principles of ve(3,3) to Pickle. Moreover, both partners and competitors like Yearn, Keeper, and VeToken have also signaled their adoption of ve(3,3) and focus on providing hard assets to holders of their governance token. Our recent pLOOKS jar does that too although via a different mechanism from ve(3,3) (using staking, fixed supply, and a timetable with cliffs that makes price shocks extremely likely), but nevertheless we have seen the palpable enchantment with revenue-sharing in ETH from a token where share-of-revenues can be easily assessed.

1 Like

Thanks that’s exactly the details I was looking for. Great proposal!

I would love if my dill revenue sharing was in a yield bearing asset so I don’t need to interact with it weekly. The only reason I’d prefer plain ETH is if we have to claim on mainnet it’ll be a lot cheaper overall than something that needs swaps/exits.
Claiming on arbitrum would be great.


I think we should get DILL as the anti-dilution rewards

As per ETH emissions it’s a meh issue. Both PICKLE and ETH rewards are correct. No strong opinions here.

About the ve3.3? Not much to see here. A clear “no” vote.

In line with longstanding team’s inflationary sentiment, and Larrys requests to change DAO votes to support inflation, this proposal also sneaks in inflation without explicitly stating how inflationary it is. The proposal uses language like anti-dilutive rewards while it implements dilutive emissions

looks to me like a lot of inflation in majority of scenarios

The proposal is extremely complex, hard to wrap your head around it, but here is my interpretation how it works:

  • It’s a request for DILL holders agree to inflate value of DILL and PICKLE so that this value is transferred under governance of the team on the treasury balance sheet.
  • instead of focusing on key aspects of Pickle aggregator operations, this tokenomics change will shift team’s focus to taking from DILL/PICKLE holders and redistributing to the treasury address
  • it’s a proposal to implement 3,3 mechanics (OHM and forks), plagued with rampant fraud, trading sometimes below treasury value. It’s a proposal to copy Solidly which is and exchange that is soon getting closed down.
  • It’s implementing dynamics, that 99.9% users will not understand despite significant efforts.

Most importantly, I don’t see the need to do so. So much brainpower going to design and implement something that in my opinion is not needed at all. Team says it wants PICKLE. How much PICKLE is there on the treasury balance sheet at the moment? Is that not enough?

Since the team wants to inflate and the DAO does not want to have their DILL/PICKLE inflated, implementing bigger proportion of renumeration to be paid in PICKLE could increase incentive alignment between team and dill holders.


1 Like

Thanks for the feedback, Jimmy.

You’ll be able to vote for that then.

An example has been provided in the Notes (no. 5). Emissions to Farms will not change even if only Part I passes. Emissions to Farms will decrease if both Part I and Part II pass. Emissions will continue to decrease as more PICKLE is locked, that is the meaning of (3,3) behind ve(3,3).

It does look like this image has the emissions numbers 10x’d – likely a typo.

I would point out that there is an Abstract and a Specification which are both very straight-forward bulletpoints explaining in layman and slightly more technical terms exactly what will happen if either Part I, Part II, or both pass. This will significantly reduce the need for “interpretation” which is probably the source of confusion here.

Let me try and break it down while addressing your concerns:

  • we are asking DILL holders to receive 100% of revenues in exchange for a Treasury mint of PICKLE, which will then be locked for DILL so the Treasury has access to funds for operations.
    • the net effect on PICKLE circulating supply is zero.
    • everyone who is locked keeps their locked PICKLEs. Revenues going to DILL will increase by 11.1% (2.22x revenues divided by 2 from sharing DILL with Treasury). Net effect on yield for each DILL holder is actually positive (increase in revenue-share + now ETH + PICKLE dual rewards).
    • the DILL supply will increase, if anything observers usually think increasing the % of locked tokens to be a good thing.
  • Some points here:
    • Focusing on the key aspects of our operations is what the team does on a day-to-day basis. This is a proposal addressing concerns raised by community regarding pain points with the DILL tokenomics.
    • An enhancement of Pickle tokenomics and improving Pickle operations are not mutually exclusive. For example, using a high-liquidity fee token such as ETH means our jars can start collecting fees in ETH directly, which will save the Treasury tens of thousands of dollars in transaction fees and currency risks.
    • The Proposal will shift the focus of the whole DAO into generating as much ETH as possible for distributions, with the Treasury being in the same lot as DILL holders, including individual team members. I am unsure how the proposal, well understood, can come to mean a change to taking from DILL holders into the Treasury (as-is the Treasury takes 50% of revenues and CORN another 5% of revenues from DILL holders; if the proposal passes, the Treasury will get paid at the same time as DILL holders then pay CORN out of its takings).
  • Again, to clarity:
    • (3,3) mechanics refer to Nash equilibrium state of beneficial cooperation. Pickle has never been associated with these projects and is not adopting their business model (stablecoins backed by bonding, rebasing, etc.).
    • Solidly ($700M TVL) is not closing down. Solidex ($400M TVL) is going to maintain their frontend: https://twitter.com/SolidexFantom/status/1500413233705934848.
    • Pickle is merely adapting some ve(3,3) changes from Solidly. Keep in mind that Solidly is a “protocol-to-protocol DEX” and was built with ve(3,3) in mind. A better way to approach the discussion is to focus on what the changes proposed are and their impact on Pickle and not “guilt by association”
  • I think users will find it easier to understand that the $PICKLE they receive for farming with us can be locked to generate $ETH (from our revenues), and won’t dilute (thanks to $PICKLE anti-dilutive rewards) vs at present where we have to explain to them that the $PICKLE they receive for locking $DILL is coming from buybacks. For better or worse, all other aspects of $DILL (decay, boosts, on-chain voting) will remain the same.

I hope that was of use. There is now a transcript and a call attached to the RFC from the governance call earlier today.

This RFC has reached the required number of signaling votes and will proceed shortly to Snapshot voting. Feel free to continue to comment as this thread will remain open in the meantime.

I’ve looked at this proposal for several days and I still don’t understand it. I suspect it’s not me being dumb but it’s the proposal being extremely complex.

So back to inflation.
I keep saying that to me it all looks inflationary (in fact I can tell without reading that if it can,it will be inflationary given the past proposals and teams’ push for inflation).
You keep saying that the emissions to farms will not change.

I suspect you’re just using a crafty language to hide that in fact there will likely be significant increase in PICKLE inflation which will now consist of emissions to farms and DILL.

Can we please have 3-5 likely scenarios showing the total PICKLE inflation to farms and DILL under the new proposal, compared to the current inflation? Some with more and some with less pickle locked for DILL. Please don’t omit the fact that currently 45% of revenue is being used to buy back PICKLE and it will not be used for such purpose if the ETH part passes.

This proposal says that the team will use the treasury to buy and sell PICKLE. Seriously, guys, just make good autocompounding tools, stop trying to run a hedge fund. Crypto hedge funds are best known for rampant fraud.
You’re asking DILLDAO for permission to potentially manipulate PICKLE price as you please without any real supervision.

Not saying you’re dumb, Jimmy. Your feedback is welcome, like that of any valuable DAO member. The Proposal is long and has many parts but the essence is simple enough I can summarise it in five short bulletpoints below:

  1. DILL distributions to be paid in $ETH instead of $PICKLE from buybacks.
  2. DILL holders to receive $PICKLE from emissions with overall emissions sent to DILL being on the proportion of DILL supply / PICKLE supply.
  3. PICKLE emissions to change dynamically based on DILL supply / PICKLE supply – on one extreme where everything is locked (DILL/PICKLE = 1) emissions will be zero; on the other extreme (DILL/PICKLE = 0) emissions will be 0.15 PICKLE/block.
  4. DILL to receive 100% of revenues.
  5. Treasury to receive a mint of PICKLE equal to the number of PICKLEs currently locked on DILL, then perma-lock those PICKLEs to own at least 50% of DILL. Treasury will use dual-rewards for authorized purposes under SCCOC control (same as now).

We would love some constructive criticism on where the proposal can improve (for example certain parameters you feel the DAO could give more input on, etc.) as it is not yet for Snapshot voting yet.

Thanks, I have specifically requested a few realistic scenarios to assess the PICKLE inflation in relation to current inflation and PICKLE buybacks.

How the current 0.05 PICKLE emissions and buybacks compare to your proposal with PICKLE emissions to DILL?
Is the effect of this proposal a 3x increase of inflation and stop of the PICKLE buybacks?
“to mitigate impact to farms, emissions will be set to 0.15 picklePerBlock as new initial state of the system.”

I understand the key principles very well. I don’t understand the specifics as these have been poorly explained with vague statements, I suspect intentionally to hide inflation.

A tiny suggestion about this opportunity to airdrop $PICKLE to certain groups - Instead of directly airdropping the tokens, can we do a NFT drop (with a trait specifying the $CORN amount in this wallet), then require the users to claim by burning this NFT in a claiming page?

It is a preferred way to avoid $PICKLE going to some “dead” wallet, if it is something that the team would want to avoid. If the team doesn’t mind some $PICKLE end up in some dead wallets, then token airdrop would likely incur the lowest cost.

1 Like

I’m not aware of Pickle Finance treasury planning any airdrops but the treasury address is public and I’m sure nobody would mind donations to the Pickle Finance treasury address.

There’s a short paragraph here.